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Abstract—This work considers identity attack on a
radio-frequency identification (RFID)-based backscatter
communication system. Specifically, we consider a single-
reader, single-tag RFID system whereby the reader and the
tag undergo two-way signaling which enables the reader
to extract the tag ID in order to authenticate the legitimate
tag (L-tag). We then consider a scenario whereby a
malicious tag (M-tag)—having the same ID as the L-
tag programmed in its memory by a wizard—attempts
to deceive the reader by pretending to be the L-tag. To
this end, we counter the identity attack by exploiting the
non-reciprocity of the end-to-end channel (i.e., the residual
channel) between the reader and the tag as the fingerprint
of the tag. The passive nature of the tag(s) (and thus, lack
of any computational platform at the tag) implies that
the proposed light-weight physical-layer authentication
method is implemented at the reader. To be concrete,
in our proposed scheme, the reader acquires the raw
data via two-way (challenge-response) message exchange
mechanism, does least-squares estimation to extract the
fingerprint, and does binary hypothesis testing to do
authentication. We also provide closed-form expressions
for the two error probabilities of interest (i.e., false alarm
and missed detection). Simulation results attest to the
efficacy of the proposed method.
Index Terms—backscatter communication, authentica-
tion, identity attacks, non-reciprocal hardware, transmit-
ter identification, intrusion detection
I. INTRODUCTION
In backscatter communication systems, the
reader/interrogator sends out a continuous-wave
signal, while the tag utilizes passive reflection or load
modulation of incident radio frequency wave to respond
back to the reader. This two-way (challenge-response)
message exchange helps the reader extract useful
information from the intended tag[1]. Backscatter
communication systems are widely utilized in a number
of application scenarios, e.g., transport and medical
industries, access control, smart parking and smart grids,
to name a few [2]. The increasing demand of high
data rates in backscatter communication systems has
prompted the researchers to build full-duplex backscatter
communication systems [3]. In a typical single-reader,
single-tag, full-duplex backscatter communication
system, the reader transmits and receives the radio
signal simultaneously whereas the tag load modulates
and backscatters the radio signal transmitted by the
reader.
The broadcast nature of backscatter communication
makes it vulnerable to many attacks by adversaries. To
counter such attacks in many wireless communication
systems, cryptographic measures have been widely
used. But, there are limitations of these crypto-based
measures. One main limitation is the dependency on the
shared secret or shared secret key among legal nodes.
Recently, authors in [4] reported that the integrity of
crypto-based measures is at high risk due to advances
in quantum computing, and thus, crypto-based measures
are quantum insecure. In this regard, physical layer
security (PLS) which exploits the unique characteristics
of the propagation medium [5], [6] is a promising
approach to complement the crypto-based schemes at
the higher layers of the protocol stack.
One essential ingredient of the PLS is Physical layer
authentication (PLA)—basically a tool which a receiver
could utilize to verify the identities of the transmit
nodes. PLA has received considerable attention of the
researchers due to its light-weight implementation and
robust nature. PLA exploits the unique features of the
propagation medium which are nearly impossible to
clone unless and until the malicious node is co-located
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with the legitimate node whose probability is almost
zero in practice. To date, there are various features
reported for physical layer authentication, e.g., received
signal strength [7], channel impulse response [8], [9],
[10] channel frequency response [11], carrier frequency
offset [12], pathloss [13], [14], lack of hardware
reciprocity [15], I/Q imbalance [16] to name a few.
More recently, distance, angle-of-arrival and position
of the transmit node are reported in [17] to thwart the
impersonation attack in an underwater acoustic sensor
network (UWASN). Last but not the least, [18] studies
the impact of authentication on effective capacity of an
UWASN.
Though there are many works reported on the physical
layer security in backscatter communication systems,
most of them counter the eavesdropping attacks through
resource allocation and artificial noise generation. Thus,
there are only a handful of works which study physical
layer authentication in half-duplex backscatter commu-
nication. Specifically, [19] exploited the propagation sig-
natures of the tag, while [20] used analogue fingerprints
of the tag. Finally, [21] reported difference of the radio
signal as a fingerprint to authenticate the tag. In contrast
to previous works, this work thwarts identity attacks
on RFID-based backscatter communication systems by
exploiting residual channel as tag fingerprint in order
to carry out physical layer authentication at the reader.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section II describes the system model of
an RFID-based backscatter communication system that
is under identity attack by a malicious tag. Section
III presents the proposed physical layer authentication
method. Section IV discusses simulation results. Finally,
Section V concludes the work.
Notations: Unless otherwise specified, we use (.)H
for hermitian, (.)T for transpose, (.)−1 for inverse,
uppercase bold face letters for matrix and lowercase
bold face letters for vectors (e.g. X denotes a matrix,
x denotes a vector). Finally, ∣∣x∣∣ is l2 norm of vector x
and CN means complex normal.
II. SYSTEM MODEL & BACKGROUND
A. System Model
We consider an RFID-based backscatter communica-
tion system that comprises a single reader and a single
tag. We then consider the situation whereby a malicious
tag (M-tag) launches identity attack on the reader by
pretending to be the legitimate tag (L-tag), (see Fig. 1).
We also learn from Fig. 1 that the traditional crypto-
based authentication mechanism at the reader fails as
long as the M-tag has the same tag ID as that of
the L-tag. Therefore, this work proposes to carry out
physical layer authentication at the reader whereby the
reader measures the fingerprint (residual channel) and
compares it against the pre-stored ground truth1. Here, it
is worth mentioning that this work considers such RFID
backscatter communication systems where the tag lies
in the far field of the reader.
Fig. 1. System model: consider an RFID-based access control system
which fails (i.e., it grants access to the M-tag) when the tag ID of the
M-tag is the same as the tag ID of the L-tag. The proposed method
counters such identity attacks by doing physical layer authentication
using residual channel (RC) as device fingerprint at the reader.
B. Background: Reciprocity
The non-reciprocal nature of factory manufactured
wireless transceivers can be modeled by their reciprocity
parameters (RPs). For a given transceiver, there are two
RPs: one for Tx chain and one for Rx chain. Fig. 2 shows
the two RPs of the reader (hTXR and h
RX
R ) and the two
RPs of the tag (hTXT and h
RX
T ). The RPs represent the
magnitude and phase distortion caused by the RF chains,
and thus, are device dependent and unique.
III. PHYSICAL LAYER AUTHENTICATION
The proposed PLA method consists of two steps: (i)
feature/fingerprint acquisition using two-way message
1Note that the reader acquires the ground truth/fingerprint of the
L-tag on a secure channel offline, and later, estimates the residual
channel on the insecure/open channel online.
Fig. 2. Two-way challenge-response signaling
exchange followed by least-squares estimation of the
fingerprint, (ii) binary hypothesis testing for tag iden-
tification.
A. Fingerprint Acquisition
1) Two-Way Challenge-Response Signaling: We con-
sider ”reader-talk-first” communication protocol [3]. For
the two-way (challenge-response) message exchange,
tag follows amplify and forward (AF) relaying mech-
anism. The reader transmits the challenge message xR
with power PR, and a while later, receives the backscat-
tered response signal from the tag. The challenge mes-
sage received at the tag at time n is:
yT [n] = √PR.xR[n].hTR +√PSI,T zT [n] (1)
where hTR = hTXR hRFTRhRXT is the end-to-end directional
channel from the reader to the tag; zT [n] is the self-
interference signal seen by the tag, and PSI,T is the
power of self-interference signal at the tag. Inline with
previous literature [22], [23], we do not consider noise
in Eq. (1). The response message received at the reader
is:
yR[n] = ηhRT yT [n] +√PSI,RzR[n] + nR, (2)
Where hRT = hTXT hRFRT hRXR is the end-to-end directional
channel from the tag to the reader and nR ∼ CN (0, σ2R)
is the noise at the reader. Additionally η, zR[n] and√
PSI,R represent amplification factor, self-interference
signal and power of interference signal at the reader,
respectively. Equivalently:
yR[n] = √PRηhRThTRxR[n] +√PSI,T ηhRT zT [n]+√PSI,RzR[n] + nR.
(3)
Inline with the previous literature [24], we assume
that the self-interference signals
√
PSI,T ηhRT zT ∼CN (0, σ2R,SI) and √PSI,RzR ∼ CN (0, σ2T,SI). Where
σ2R,SI and σ
2
T,SI is the variance of self interference signal
at reader and tag respectively.
Let nRT = √PSI,T ηhRT zT [n] +√PSI,RzR[n] + nR.
Then, Eq. (3) can be written as:
yR[n] = √PRηhˆRTx[n] + nRT , (4)
Where, nRT ∼ CN (0, σ2R + σ2R,SI + σ2T,SI), while
hˆRT = hTRhRT is the end-to-end residual channel
between the reader and the tag.
2) Least-Square Estimation of Residual Channel: To
estimate the fingerprint hˆRT of the tag, the reader sends
N training symbols xR = [xR[1] xR[2] ... xR[N]]T
during the challenge phase. The tag acts as AF relay
and backscatters the amplified signal. Thus, the reader
receives yR = [yR[1] yR[2] ... yR[N]]T during response
phase:
yR = hˆRT .xˆR + nRT , (5)
where xˆR = η√PR.xR. Then, the least-squares estimate
is given as:
hˆ = (xˆHR .xˆR)−1.xˆHR .yR (6)
which implies that hˆ ∼ CN (hˆRT , σ2hˆ). Here, σ2hˆ =
σ2RT
η2PR∣∣xR∣∣2 and σ2RT = σ2R + σ2R,SI + σ2T,SI .
B. Binary Hypothesis Testing
With the estimate of the tag’s fingerprint and perfect
ground truth in hand, the reader performs binary hypoth-
esis testing for tag identification. The binary hypothesis
test is defined as:⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩H0(L-tag is present) ∶ υ = hˆ
(L)
RT + 
H1(M-tag is present) ∶ υ = hˆ(M)RT +  (7)
Here  ∼ CN (0, σ2
hˆ
) is the estimation error. Then,
υ∣H0 ∼ CN (hˆ(L)RT , σ2hˆ) and υ∣H1 ∼ CN (hˆ(M)RT , σ2hˆ). The
test statistic T is given as:
T = ∣υ − hˆ(L)RT ∣ H1≷
H0
δ (8)
where δ is threshold, a design parameter. Let t = υ −
hˆ
(L)
RT , then t∣H0 ∼ CN (0, σ2hˆ) and t∣H1 ∼ CN (hˆ(M)RT −
hˆ
(L)
RT , σ
2
hˆ
). Further, T ∣H0 ∼ Rayleigh(√(σ2
hˆ
/2). Now,
the probability of false alarm is:
Pfa = Pr(T > δ∣H0) = exp(−δ2
σ2
hˆ
) (9)
By setting Pfa to desired tolerance level, δ is computed
as:
δ = √−ln(Pfa)σ2
hˆ
(10)
The performance of proposed method can be completely
characterized by probability of false alarm and prob-
ability of missed detection. Since we are following
Neyman-Pearson criterion, the performance of proposed
method is solely dependent on success probability of
M-tag or probability of missed detection. Since, T ∣H1 ∼
Rice(hˆ(M)RT − hˆ(L)RT ,√σ2hˆ/2), the success probability of
M-tag can be expressed as:
Pmd = Pr(T < δ∣H1) (11)
Let µ = hˆ(M)RT − hˆ(L)RT and σˆ = σ2hˆ/2. Then,
Pmd = 1 −Q1(µ
σˆ
,
δ
σˆ
) (12)
where Q1(., .) is the Marcum Q-function of order 1.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We define signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) at the reader as: SINR = η
2PR
σ2RT
.
Fig. 3 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves for various different values of SINR. Note that
Pd = 1 − Pmd is the probability of correct detection. To
obtain this plot, we sweep the Pfa from zero to one
and then the threshold is calculated accordingly, then,
for the given threshold we compute Pd. We observe
that for a give value of Pfa, Pd increases with increase
in the SINR.
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Fig. 3. ROC curves: for any pre-specified Pfa, Pd increases with
increase in SINR.
Fig. 4 shows the ROC curves for different values of
Eve’s fingerprint. We observe that for any pre-specified
Pfa, Pd increases as the fingerprint hˆRE of the M-tag
becomes more dissimilar to the fingerprint hˆRT of the
L-tag. We fixed SINR to 5 dB to obtain this result.
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Fig. 4. ROC curves: for any pre-specified Pfa, Pd increases as the
fingerprint of the M-tag becomes more dissimilar to the fingerprint
of the L-tag.
V. CONCLUSION
This work studied identity attack on an RFID-based
backscatter communication system and proposed to uti-
lize the so-called residual channel as the fingerprint of
the tag(s) in order to verify the identity of the tag(s) at
the reader. In our proposed scheme, the reader acquired
the raw data via two-way (challenge-response) message
exchange mechanism, did least-squares estimation to
extract the fingerprint, and did binary hypothesis testing
to do the authentication. We also provided closed-form
expressions for the two error probabilities of interest
(i.e., false alarm and missed detection).
Future work will look into other relevant fea-
tures/fingerprints (e.g., tag antenna impedance, tag an-
tenna gain etc.) which could be used as device finger-
prints for authentication in near-field RFID systems.
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